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Symmetric Lightweight Primitives
Lightweight Primitives
▶ Lightweight primitives designed for constrained
environments, like RFID tags, sensor networks.
▶ Real need ⇒ an enormous amount of proposals in the
last years (block and stream ciphers, hash functions):
PRESENT, LED, KATAN/KTANTAN, KLEIN, PRINCE,
PRINTcipher, LBLOCK, TWINE, XTEA, mCrypton,
Iceberg, HIGHT, Piccolo, SIMON, SPECK, SEA, DESL...
▶ NIST competition to start around december 2018,
comments on call close the 28 June!
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Draft: NIST competition
AEAD and hash functions. (Some) requirements:
▶ Efficient for short messages.
▶ Compact HW and embedded SW implementations with
low RAM/ROM.
▶ Key preprocessing efficient.
▶ Different strategies: low energy/low power/low latency.
▶ Performant in different microcontroller architectures...
Better in constrained environments than existing standards.
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Lightweight Primitives
▶ Any attack better than the generic one is considered
a “break”.
▶ Cryptanalysis of lightweight primitives:
a fundamental task, responsibility of the community.
▶ Importance of cryptanalysis (especially on new
proposals): the more a cipher is analyzed, the more
confidence we can have in it...
▶ ...or know which algorithms are not secure to use.
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Lightweight Primitives
▶ Lightweight: more ’risky’ design, lower security margin,
simpler components.
▶ Often innovative constructions: dedicated attacks
▶ Types of attacks: single-key/related-key, distinguisher/key-
recovery, weak-keys,...
▶ Importance of attacks on reduced versions.
▶ High complexities: ugly properties or security margin
determined.
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Main Objectives of this talk
▶ Perform a (non-exhaustive) survey of proposals and
their security status.
▶ Provide the intuition of the “most useful attacks”
against LW ciphers.
▶ Conclusions and remarks (link with hash functions).
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Survey of Proposals 1
▶ Feistel Networks - best external analysis
DESLX - none
ITUbee - self-similarity (8/20r)
LBlock - imposs. diff. (24/32r)
SEA - none
SIMON and SPECK - imposs. diff., diff, 0-correl.
XTEA - mitm (23/64r)
CLEFIA - imposs. diff. (13/18r)
HIGHT - 0-correlation (27/32r)
TWINE - mitm,imposs. diff.,0-corr (25/36r)




KLEIN - dedicated attack (full round)
LED - EM generic attacks (8/12r, 128K)
Zorro - diff. (full round)
mCrypton - mitm (9/12r, 128K)
PRESENT - mult. dim. lin. (27/31r)
PRINTcipher - invariant-wk (full round)
PRIDE - diff (18/20r)
PRINCE - mult. diff (10/12r)




KTANTAN/KATAN - mitm (153/254r)
Grain - correl./ cube attacks (some full)
Trivium - cube attacks (800/1152) -
Sprout - guess-and-determine (full round)
Quark -condit. diff (25%)
Fruit - divide and conquer (full)




Chaskey - diff-lin (7/8r)
Hight - 0-correl (27/32r)
LEA - diff. (14/24r)
RC5 - diff. (full round)
Salsa20 - diff (8/20r)
Sparx - imposs. diff. (15/24r)
Speck - diff. (17/32r)
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More Proposals
For more details, primitives, classifications, see:
State of the Art in Lightweight Symmetric Cryptography,





▶ Impossible differentials (Feistel)




Classical Differential Attacks [BS’90]
Given an input difference between two plaintexts, some
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Truncated Differential Attacks [K 94]
A truncated path predicts only parts of the differences.
Let’s see a simple example:
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Truncated path: example
X X  X X X  X X X
0 0  0 X X  X ? ?
 0 0  0  0 0  0  X X 
0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0
0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0
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Impossible Differential Attacks [K,BBS’98]
▶ Impossible differential attacks use a differential with
probability 0.
▶ We can find the impossible differential using
the Miss-in-the-middle [BBS’98] technique.
▶ Extend it backward and forward ⇒ Active Sboxes
transitions give information on the involved key bits.
▶ Generic framework and improvements [BNPS14,BLNPS17]
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Example: LBlock
Designed by Wu and Zhang, (ACNS 2011).







Inside the function F :
▶ add the subkey to the input.
▶ 8 different Sboxes 4× 4.
▶ a nibble permutation P :
Best attack so far: Imp. Diff. on 23 rounds
[CFMS’14,BMNPS’14] and RK on 24 rounds [SHS’15].
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▶ Given one pair of inputs with ∆in that produces ∆out,
▶ all the (partial) keys that produce ∆X from ∆in and
∆Y from ∆out differ from the correct one.
▶ If we consider N pairs verifying (∆in,∆out) the
probability of NOT discarding a candidat key is
(1− 2−cin−cout)N
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For the Attacks to Work







where Cdata is the data needed for obtaining N pairs (∆in,∆out),
CN is the average cost of testing the pairs per candidate key (early













































Impossible Differential on LBlock
▶ For 21 rounds a complexity of 269.5 in time with 263
data, for 22: 271.53 time and 260 data, for 23: 275.36
time and 259 data.
▶ Feistel constructions in general are good targets
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Improvements [BN-PS14,BLN-PS17,B18]
▶ Multiple impossible differentials (related to [JN-PP13])
▶ Correctly choosing∆in and∆out (related to [MRST09])
▶ State-test technique (related to [MRST09])
▶ More accurate estimate of the pairs [B18]
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Example: CLEFIA-128
• block size: 4× 32 = 128 bits
• key size: 128 bits
























Formalize the idea of [Tsunoo et al. 08]:
CLEFIA has two 9-round impossible differentials
((0, 0, 0, A) ̸→ (0, 0, 0, B)) and ((0, A, 0, 0) ̸→ (0, B, 0, 0))
when A and B verify:
A B
(0, 0, 0, α) (0, 0, β, 0) or (0, β, 0, 0) or (β, 0, 0, 0)
(0, 0, α, 0) (0, 0, 0, β) or (0, β, 0, 0) or (β, 0, 0, 0)
(0, α, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0, β) or (0, 0, β, 0) or (β, 0, 0, 0)
(α, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0, β) or (0, 0, β, 0) or (0, β, 0, 0)
24 in total: Cdata = 2




Reduce the number of key bits involved.
B = ■⊕ S0(■⊕■)⊕■
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State Test Technique
Reduce the number of key bits involved.
B′ = ■⊕ S0(■⊕■) (with B = B′
⊕
■)




Applications of Improved Impossible Diff
▶ CLEFIA: best attack on CLEFIA (13 rounds).
▶ Camellia: Improved best attacks for Camellia.
▶ AES: attacks comparable with best mitm ones
(7 rounds).




▶ Introduced by Diffie and Hellman in 1977.
▶ Largely applied tool.
▶ Few data needed.
▶ Many improvements: partial matching, bicliques, sieve-
in-the-middle...
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▶ Improvement of MITM attacks, but also...
▶ It can always be applied to reduce the total number
of computations (at least the precomputed part)
⇒ acceleration of exhaustive search [BKR’11] 2
▶ Many other accelerated exhaustive search on LW block
ciphers: PRESENT, LED, KLEIN, HIGHT, Piccolo,
TWINE, LBlock ... (less than 2 bits of gain).
▶ Is everything broken? No.















































Improved Bicliques [CN-PV 13]
Can we build bicliques with only one pair of P-C?
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Sieve-in-the-Middle [CN-PV’13]
▶ Compute partial inputs and outputs of S





























▶ nin known bits out of m: at most 2m−nin values for the
nout output bits.
▶ A transition exists with probability p.
▶ Sieve when nin + nout > m ⇒ p < 1
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How do we sieve?
▶ We obtain a list LA of partial inputs u and a list LB
of partial outputs v ⇒ merge LA and LB with the
condition (u, v) is a valid transition though S.
▶ Naive way costs |LA| × |LB| = 2|K1|+|K2|:
no gain with respect to exhaustive search.
▶ We need an efficient procedure.
Often S is a concatenation of S-boxes.
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Merging the lists
Merging the lists with respect to R
▶ R is group-wise, i.e. for z groups
R(u, v) = Πzi=1Ri(ui, vi)
Find all u ∈ LA and v ∈ LB such that R(u, v) = 1.
▶ Subcase of the first problem in [N-P 11].
































▶ Problem also appears in divide-and-conquer attacks
(and rebound attacks).
▶ Solutions from list merging algorithms [N-P-11] and
dissection algorithms [DDKS 12]
▶ Many applications: ARMADILLO2 [ABN-PVZ 11],
ECHO256 [JN-PS 11], JH42 [N-PTV 11],
Grøstl [JN-PP 12], Klein [LN-P 14],




▶ Reduced-round: PRESENT, DES, PRINCE,
AES-biclique [Canteaut N-P Vayssieres 13]
▶ Reduced-round LBlock [Altawy Youssef 14]
▶ Best reduced-round KATAN [Fuhr Minaud 14]
▶ Reduced-round Simon [Song et al 14]
▶ Low-data AES [Bogdanov et.al 15]
[Tao et al 15]
▶ MIBS80/PRESENT80 [Faghihi et al 16]
▶ Interesting for low data attacks...
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PRESENT [BKLPPRSV’07]
▶ One of the most popular ciphers, proposed in 2007,
and now ISO/IEC standard.
▶ Very large number of analysis published (20+).
▶ Best attacks so far: multiple linear attacks (27r/31r).
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PRESENT
Block n = 64 bits, key 80 or 128 bits.
⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕
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16 values of x2, x1, x0, y1, y0, out of 32, correspond to a valid transition.
Sieving through the Sboxes
❙ ❙ ❙ ❙ ❙ ❙ ❙ ❙ ❙ ❙ ❙ ❙ ❙ ❙ ❙ ❙
▶ Probability for 1 Sbox p = 16/32 = 1/2
▶ Probability for the 6 Sboxes: 1
26
▶ We only try 280−6 = 274 potential key candidates.




▶ Few cases broken by well known attacks (ex. Puffin or
Puffin2 - multiple differentials)
▶ Happily, this is rare. Most of the times, new families
or new ideas on known attacks exploiting the new
properties are needed.
▶ Lightweight: more ’risky’ design, lower security margin,
simpler components.
▶ Often innovative constructions: dedicated attacks
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Ex: PRESENT and PRINTcipher
PRESENT [BKLPPRSV’07]
▶ One of the most popular ciphers, proposed in 2007,
and now ISO/IEC standard.
▶ Very large number of analysis published (20+).
▶ Best attacks so far: multiple linear attacks (27r/31r).
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PRESENT
Block n = 64 bits, key 80 or 128 bits.
⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕
S15 S14 S13 S12 S11 S10 S 9 S 8 S 7 S 6 S 5 S 4 S 3 S 2 S 1 S 0
⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕
31 rounds + 1 key addition.
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PRESENT
Linear cyptanalysis: because of the Sbox, a linear
approximation 1 to 1 with bias 2−3 per round [O-09].
▶ Multiple linear attacks: consider several possible




▶ Many PRESENT-like ciphers proposed, like
Puffin, PRINTcipher
▶ Usually, weaker than the original.
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▶ Weak key attack, but a very bad property for 251
keys...
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The Invariant Subspace Attack
▶ More applications afterwards:
iScream, Robin, Zorro, Midori.
▶ Importance of generalizing/understanding
dedicated attacks:
new families/techniques might appear.
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Final remarks
Zorro - Hash Functions links
▶ Lightweight block cipher proposed [GGN-PS13] for easy
masking.
▶ A modified AES with only four sboxes per round
(SPN with partial non-linear layer).
▶ Bounds on number of active Sboxes? Computed using
freedom degrees.
▶ Many analyses published. Problem: MC property
⇒ devastating attack [BDDLT13, RASA13]
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LED - Hash Functions links
▶ Lightweight block cipher proposed in [GPPR12].
▶ AES-like with simpler key-schedule and more rounds.
Nice simple design.
▶ Analysis provided with respect to known key
distinguishers (rebound-like). Seems like a lot of SHA-3
knowledge put into this design.
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Hash functions links - Sum up
▶ Mitm, bicliques/initial structures:
used for both scenarios
▶ Early abort ← message modification techniques
▶ State-test tech. & choosing∆in,out← Rebound attacks
▶ Mult. impos. diff. ← mult. limited birthday
distinguishers
▶ Using freedom degrees for bounds?... be careful!!
▶ Merging lists from rebounds/sieve in the middle
→ many applications





▶ Classical attacks, but also new dedicated ones
exploiting the originality of the designs.
▶ Importance on generalizing: improvements, and
dedicated might become well stablished techniques.
▶ Importance of reduced-round analysis to re-think
security margin, or as first steps of further analysis.
▶ New ideas inspired by SHA-3: might help improving
attacks further!
▶ Better identifying composite problems/ list merging
situations might provide improved results.
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To Sum Up3
A lot of ciphers to analyze/ a lot
of work to do!
3Thank you to Christina Boura and Leo Perrin for their help with the figures and
the slides.
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